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GONZALES V. RAICH: POLITICAL
SAFEGUARDS UP IN SMOKE?
The subject to which the [commerce] power is next applied, is to
commerce "among the several States."...
It is not intended to say that these words comprehend that com-
merce, which is completely internal, which is carried on between
man and man in a State, or between different parts of the same
State, and which does not extend to or affect other States. Such a
power would be inconvenient, and is certainly unnecessary.'
INTRODUCTION
How far the Supreme Court has come from this initial construction
of the Commerce Clause offered by Chief Justice John Marshall. The
Court's current understanding is, if not wholly inconsistent with where
it stood nearly two centuries ago, decidedly more permissive. 2 While
intrastate activities such as manufacturing were once held beyond the
scope of federal power,3 this is no longer the case. The Court now
readily defers to Congress's use of the Commerce Clause as grounds
for regulating intrastate issues ranging from prejudice4 to the buying
and selling of cut flowers.5 In the late 1990s, a pair of cases invalidat-
ing commerce legislation 6 suggested an end to the Court's capitula-
tion. But the recent decision in Gonzales v. Raich,7 upholding the
application of federal commerce legislation to intrastate medicinal
marijuana use, exposed those cases as outliers in a larger pattern of
deference to Congress.
One rationale the Court has offered for this trend of acquiescence is
that of "political safeguards." This theory holds that the presence of
1. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 194 (1824) (emphasis added).
2. See Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REV.
101, 125-30 (2001) (discussing judicial interpretation of the Commerce Clause through the
1930s); Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV. 1387,
1443-54 (1987) (discussing how the Court "systematically removed" previous limitations on the
Commerce Clause between 1937 and 1942).
3. United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1895) (holding that federal antitrust
laws regulating commerce could not reach merger of manufacturers because "[clommerce suc-
ceeds to manufacture, and is not a part of it").
4. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000h-6 (2000).
5. Fresh Cut Flowers and Fresh Cut Greens Promotion and Information Act of 1993, 7 U.S.C.
§§ 6801-6814 (2000).
6. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549
(1995).
7. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
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state representatives in Congress inherently protects against the un-
warranted expansion of federal power. 8 But there are many reasons
why members of Congress may have incentives to augment federal
power beyond its constitutional reach.9 And although state and local
governments theoretically present an additional level of protection, 10
there are situations in which the states themselves have incentives to
welcome the intrusion. In these cases, the individual values that fed-
eralism serves tt can be sacrificed in the interest of governmental con-
venience, and relying on political safeguards to protect the federal
balance looks like letting the fox guard the henhouse. 12 The Con-
trolled Substances Act (CSA) 13 at issue in Raich implicated all of
these issues.
This Note addresses the Court's decision in Gonzales v. Raich. Part
II reviews the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence and discusses
how the political safeguards theory has informed the increasing defer-
ence given to Congress. 14 It explains how the themes of safeguards
and deference laid the groundwork for the Court's decision in Raich.
Part III recounts the setting of Raich, as well as the Court's decision.15
Part IV critiques the Court's acceptance of the Government's asserted
basis for the CSA and argues that the political safeguards the Court
relied on may have failed in this case. 16 Part V discusses how Raich
could allow Congress to exercise the commerce power at the expense
of the federal balance. 17 It also discusses how federalism's value to
8. See generally Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the
States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543
(1954). Because the political system protects the federal balance, the theory goes, the Court
does not have to. In addition to Professor Wechsler, there are many other proponents of this
theory in the scholarly community. See, e.g., Jesse H. Choper, The Scope of National Power Vis-
d-Vis the States: The Dispensability of Judicial Review, 86 YALE L.J. 1552 (1977); Larry D.
Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV.
215 (2000).
9. See Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1485, 1522 (1994).
10. See id. at 1515-16.
11. See Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of Judicial
Review, 51 DUKE L.J. 75, 135-39 (2001); John 0. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Federalism vs. States'
Rights: A Defense of Judicial Review in a Federal System, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 89, 106-12 (2004).
12. Cf. Ernest A. Young, Making Federalism Doctrine: Fidelity, Institutional Competence, and
Compensating Adjustments, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1733, 1835 (2005). Although Professor
Young used the analogy to describe relying on Congress to limit itself, relying on the states to
limit Congress-particularly where they have every incentive not to do so-creates a similar
situation.
13. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-904 (2000).
14. See infra notes 19-123 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 124-206 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 207-298 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 299-319 and accompanying text.
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individuals-exemplified by the plaintiffs in Raich-was undermined
by the CSA. 18
II. COMMERCE CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
The Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence is the product of over
two centuries of evolution. The Court adopted a limited interpreta-
tion of the Commerce Clause in early cases.19 A shift in attitude and
broader vision accompanied the post-Depression New Deal era of the
1930s.20 In the ensuing years, the theory of political safeguards
evolved as a justification for the Court's permissive attitude towards
commerce legislation.21 But recent decisions created doubt as to
whether that attitude would continue. 2
2
A. Early Commerce Clause Decisions
The Court first interpreted the Commerce Clause in Gibbons v.
Ogden.23 Gibbons involved a New York statute governing steamboat
operating permits, which contravened an act of Congress governing
fishing licenses. 24 The Court defined the extent of the commerce
power, noting that "commerce" referred to "commercial intercourse
between nations, and parts of nations" 25 and did not extend to "that
commerce ... which is carried on between man and man in a State...
and which does not extend to or affect other States. '26 The power was
"restricted to that commerce which concerns more States than one" 27
and thus had a limited scope.28 This restriction persisted in the Lot-
tery Case,29 which upheld a statute prohibiting the transport of lottery
tickets across state lines as within the commerce power.30 The statute
did not violate the Tenth Amendment, in part because "Congress...
[did] not assume to interfere with traffic or commerce in lottery tick-
18. See infra notes 320-333 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 23-37 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 38-63 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 64-82 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 83-123 and accompanying text.
23. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
24. Id. at 1-3.
25. Id. at 189-90.
26. Id. at 194.
27. Id.
28. See Epstein, supra note 2, at 1402. But cf. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW § 5-4, at 232 (1978) (suggesting that Gibbons interpreted the commerce power to
reach "all activity having any interstate impact-however indirect" (emphasis added) (quoted in
Epstein, supra note 2, at 1402)).
29. 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
30. Id. at 355.
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ets carried on exclusively within the limits of any State.'' 31 Despite up-
holding the statute, the Court still felt it was the judiciary's role to
determine whether Congress's actions exceeded its power under the
Commerce Clause.32
The Court's willingness to fulfill that duty would soon be tested. In
the years following the Lottery Case, the Court searchingly evaluated
federal actions, often relying on arbitrary and manipulable distinctions
between "manufacture" and "commerce," 33 or "direct" and "indirect"
effects on commerce.34 But the limits on federal power that accompa-
nied those distinctions collided with an economy struggling to recover
from the Great Depression and President Franklin Roosevelt's efforts
to speed that recovery through extensive economic regulation. 35 Af-
ter the Court invalidated portions of Roosevelt's National Industrial
Recovery Act (NIRA), 36 the President threatened to "pack" the
Court with new appointees to achieve more favorable treatment of his
legislation.37
B. Commerce and the New Deal
The change in the Court's approach to the commerce power was
immediate, 38 and the result was a series of cases that "systematically
removed each of the previous limitations on the scope of the com-
merce clause."'39 The Court first abandoned its commerce/manufac-
31. Id. at 357 (emphasis added).
32. See id. at 363.
33. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 301 (1936) ("That commodities produced or
manufactured within a state are intended to be sold or transported outside the state does not
render their production or manufacture subject to federal regulation under the commerce
clause.").
34. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 546 (1935) ("In deter-
mining how far the federal government may go in controlling intrastate transactions upon the
ground that they 'affect' interstate commerce, there is a necessary and well-established distinc-
tion between direct and indirect effects.").
35. See Douglas H. Ginsburg, On Constitutionalism, in CATO SUPREME COURT REVIEW
2002-2003, at 7, 16 (James L. Swanson ed., 2003) ("During the 1930s, President Roosevelt pro-
posed and the Congress enacted New Deal legislation in the teeth of the Court's prior decisions
explicating the limits of the written Constitution. In effect, the President and the Congress dared
the Court to strike down laws with strong popular support.").
36. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp., 295 U.S. 495; Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388
(1935).
37. Ginsburg, supra note 35, at 16.
38. Some believe that the Court was attempting to appease President Roosevelt and avoid the
Court-packing plan. See id. Others argue that the Court was merely returning to the under-
standing of the commerce power espoused in Gibbons. BRUCE ACKERMAN, 2 WE THE PEOPLE:
TRANSFORMATIONS 259 (1998). For a good overview of the debate, see Laura Kalman, Law,
Politics, and the New Deal(s), 108 YALE L.J. 2165, 2168-85 (1999).
39. Epstein, supra note 2, at 1443.
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ture distinction, 40 ruling that even activities that "may be intrastate in
character when separately considered" may be regulated by Congress
"if they have such a close and substantial relation to interstate com-
merce that their control is essential or appropriate" to the exercise of
the commerce power.41 The Court next upheld the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act (FLSA), a federal ban on the interstate transportation of
goods that were not produced in accordance with particular wage and
hour requirements. 42 Validating the federal regulation of intrastate
labor standards, 43 the Court stated that the commerce power reached
even "activities intrastate which so affect interstate commerce or the
exercise of the power of Congress over it as to make regulation of
them appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end."'44
The Court's New Deal-era cases expanded Congress's power to
control interstate commerce. Intrastate activities could be regulated if
they bore a "close and substantial relation to interstate commerce, ''45
or if their products were intended to enter interstate commerce. 46 The
Court next approved congressional efforts to set minimum prices for
the sale of commodities produced and consumed entirely intrastate,47
on the grounds that intrastate sales burdened interstate commerce in
those commodities. 48 The final, and most important, 49 piece of the
Commerce Clause puzzle came shortly thereafter.
Wickard v. Filburn50 involved federal efforts to limit the amount of
wheat grown by commercial farmers in an effort to stabilize the na-
tional wheat market. 51 Farmer Filburn was penalized for growing
40. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). Jones & Laughlin involved the
National Labor Relations Act, which established and protected unions' right to collectively bar-
gain, in part on the basis that employers' denial of that right "materially affect[ed]" commerce.
Id. at 23 n.2.
41. Id. at 37 (emphasis added). The Court's shift in approach was apparent-this interpreta-
tion had been the basis for Justice Benjamin Cardozo's dissent in Carter Coal less than a year
earlier. 298 U.S. 238, 327 (1936) (Cardozo, J., dissenting).
42. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 109-10 (1941). Citing the Lottery Case, the Court
upheld Congress's power to prohibit altogether interstate traffic in a particular article of com-
merce. Id. at 113. The Court also upheld the FLSA's requirement that producers of goods for
interstate commerce keep records to verify compliance with the labor standards. Id. at 124-25.
43. Id. at 121.
44. Id. at 118 (emphasis added).
45. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 37.
46. Darby, 312 U.S. at 122.
47. See United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110 (1942).
48. Id. at 120-21 ("[T]he unregulated sale of the intrastate milk tends to reduce the sales price
received by handlers and the amount which they in turn pay to producers.").
49. See generally Jim Chen, Filburn's Legacy, 52 EMORY L.J. 1719 (2003).
50. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
51. Id. at 114-15.
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wheat in excess of his allotted quota.52 Filburn emphasized that the
wheat he had grown was for personal use and its effect on interstate
commerce was "indirect. ' 53 The Court distilled its previous measures
of the commerce power into a new standard: economic effect. 54 If an
activity "exert[ed] a substantial economic effect on interstate com-
merce," indirect or otherwise, it was within congressional reach. 55
The Court noted that even though Filburn's individual effect on com-
merce was "trivial," his actions were still within the reach of the com-
merce power "where, as here, his contribution, taken together with that
of many others similarly situated, is far from trivial. '56 Using this
logic, the commerce power could reach actions, intrastate or other-
wise, that individually had "minuscule or no effect upon interstate
commerce at all."'57
This aggregation principle greatly expanded the range of activities
that Congress could reach. As one scholar noted, "[M]ost of what we
do, indeed all our actions in the market, have effects that extend be-
yond our immediate vicinity, especially when considered in the aggre-
gate. ' 58 Thus, the aggregation principle effectively "granted Congress
a near plenary power to do anything it wills" in its exercise of the
commerce power.59 For years, the Court seemed to sanction such ex-
ercise. The Court upheld the federal prohibition on discrimination in
hotels on the grounds that such discrimination, in the aggregate, dis-
couraged blacks from traveling interstate, affecting interstate com-
merce. 60 It upheld the prohibition on discrimination in restaurants
serving interstate patrons or preparing food that had moved inter-
state.61 And it upheld the prohibition of intrastate loan-sharking,
52. Id.
53. Id. at 119.
54. Id. at 124-25.
55. Id. at 125.
56. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 127-28 (emphasis added). This would become the most recognized
language from Wickard. Chen, supra note 49, at 1743. As Professor Chen points out, however,
this "aggregation" principle was not original to Wickard; that case merely crystallized what had
been hinted at in preceding cases. Id. at 1744 & nn.193-94 (citing United States v. Darby, 312
U.S. 100, 123 (1941) ("[I]n present day industry, competition by a small part may affect the
whole and ... the total effect of the competition of many small producers may be great." (altera-
tions in original)) and NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601, 606 (1939) ("The power of Congress to
regulate interstate commerce is plenary and extends to all such commerce be it great or
small.")).
57. RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIB-
ERTY 314 (2004).
58. Id. at 314-15.
59. Id. at 315.
60. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
61. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
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finding that the revenue it produced went largely to fund organized
crime, which in turn affected interstate commerce through various in-
terstate activities. 62 The Court indicated that it would validate federal
commerce regulations as long as Congress had a "rational basis" for
determining that the regulated conduct affected commerce. 63
C. The Commerce Clause and the Political
Safeguards of Federalism
One reason the Court began deferring to Congress in its exercise of
the commerce power was that it embraced the idea of the "political
safeguards of federalism." The political safeguards theory first gar-
nered support when Professor Herbert Wechsler published his semi-
nal article in 1954. 64 Wechsler argued that the structure of the federal
government, securing the role of the states in the "selection and the
composition of the national authority," was suitably equipped to re-
strain federal intrusions into the states' domain.65 In deciding the
proper federal-state balance, the Court should resolve disputes only
where Congress had not spoken.66 One proponent of the theory even
suggested that questions of federal action violating states' rights
"should be treated as nonjusticiable.' '67
The Court has not yet accepted that particular invitation, but it has
certainly recognized-and to some extent, endorsed 68-the notion of
62. See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
63. Under this test, the Court will defer to Congress's finding that a particular activity being
regulated affects interstate commerce, so long as there is some rational relationship linking the
activity to commerce which could allow for such a finding. See, e.g., Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining
& Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 276-77 (1981); Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 258. The
rational basis test does not seem to require that the statute at issue be constitutional, but only
that Congress reasonably believed that it was. Because of this, it has been suggested that this
standard "underenforces" the constitutional limits of the Commerce Clause, and thus serves, on
occasion, to uphold unconstitutional laws. See Kermit Roosevelt III, Constitutional Calcification:
How the Law Becomes What the Court Does, 91 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1653 (2005).
64. Wechsler, supra note 8.
65. Id. at 546, 558.
66. See id. at 560. Wechsler asserted that "the Court is on weakest ground when it opposes its
interpretation of the Constitution to that of Congress in the interest of the states, whose repre-
sentatives control the legislative process and, by hypothesis, have broadly acquiesced in sanc-
tioning the challenged Act of Congress." Id. at 559.
67. Choper, supra note 8, at 1557 (emphasis added). Professor Choper suggested that benefi-
ciaries of individual rights are less likely to be represented in the political process; thus, judicial
intervention is necessary to produce a fair constitutional judgment with respect to those rights.
Because the states' interests in the federal balance are represented in Congress, however, the
"democratic tradition" is best advanced by allowing "popularly responsible institutions" to de-
termine that balance. Id. at 1556-57.
68. See John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311, 1321-34
(1997) (discussing the Court's "willing embrace of the political safeguards argument").
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political safeguards. In Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority,69 the Court upheld the application of the FLSA to a munic-
ipally owned and operated mass-transit system. 70 Less than ten years
earlier, the Court had ruled that enforcing the FLSA against the states
"in areas of traditional governmental functions" unconstitutionally vi-
olated principles of federalism.71 In overruling that decision, the Gar-
cia Court relied on the political safeguards of federalism.72 The
Court, citing Wechsler and other political safeguards advocates,73
noted that "the political position of the States in the federal system
has served to minimize the burdens that the States bear under the
Commerce Clause. ' 74
After the NIRA cases of the mid-1930s, 75 it was nearly sixty years
before the Court again invalidated a federal statute on Commerce
Clause grounds.76 The Court did, however, strike down commerce
legislation on federalism grounds. New York v. United States77 and
Printz v. United States78 both invalidated commerce power legislation
that "commandeered" state and local officials into implementing fed-
erally crafted regulatory schemes. The Court rejected such legislation
as "fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional system of dual
sovereignty. ' 79 In both cases, the Court was concerned with political
accountability; citizens would not know which government (federal or
state) to credit or blame for the legislation.80 But the Court would
69. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
70. Id. at 555.
71. Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976), overruled by Garcia, 469 U.S.
528.
72. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 552.
73. Id. at 551 n.11. Wechsler's article had been cited in National League of Cities as well-in
Justice Brennan's dissent. 426 U.S. at 877 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
74. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 553-54.
75. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Pan. Ref. Co. v.
Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
76. Invalidating a statute on Commerce Clause grounds means that a regulation exceeded
Congress's power under the Commerce Clause. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549
(1995); Antony Barone Kolenc, Note, Commerce Clause Challenges After United States v. Lo-
pez, 50 FLA. L. REV. 867, 870 n.17 (1998).
77. 505 U.S. 144 (1992). New York v. United States involved a federal statute that required
state governments to provide for disposal, in a manner prescribed by Congress, of any low-level
radioactive waste that the state produced, or be forced to "take title" to the waste and become
liable for any damage it caused. Id. at 151-54.
78. 521 U.S. 898 (1997). Printz involved a statute requiring "chief law enforcement officer[s]"
of local jurisdictions to administer federally mandated background checks on prospective hand-
gun purchasers. Id. at 902-03.
79. Id. at 935.
80. See id. at 930 (noting that commandeering lets Congress get credit for solving problems
while forcing states to absorb the cost, and forces states to take the blame for any burden im-
posed by the legislation); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 168 ("[W]here the Federal
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address those issues only when federal legislation explicitly required
state or local governmental action; commerce laws that were "gener-
ally applicable" would face only rational basis, Commerce Clause
review. 81
So it seemed that, at least for generally applicable commerce legis-
lation, the Court would continue to defer to Congress and rely on po-
litical safeguards. But as the links to commerce offered by Congress
grew more attenuated, 82 the Court appeared to adopt a more demand-
ing standard.
D. The Modern Era of the Commerce Clause
In United States v. Lopez,8 3 the Court invalidated the Gun-Free
School Zones Act of 1990 (GFSZA), 84 which made the possession of a
firearm in a school zone a federal crime.85 The Court set forth "three
broad categories of activity" that were within the scope of the com-
merce power:86 the "use of the channels of interstate commerce"; 87
the regulation and protection of "the instrumentalities of interstate
commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce"; 88 and the
authority to regulate "those activities that substantially affect inter-
state commerce. '89 The Court summarized the "substantial effects"
Government compels States to regulate, the accountability of both state and federal officials is
diminished.").
81. Compare New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 177-78, with Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S.
141, 151 (2000) (upholding the Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994 (DPPA), 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2721-2725 (2000), which regulated the sale and disclosure of driver's license information ac-
quired by the states). The Reno v. Condon Court distinguished New York v. United States on the
grounds that the DPPA "does not require the States ... to regulate their own citizens," but
rather regulated "the States as the owners of data bases." Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. at 151.
Although it is not clear what standard of review was applied in New York v. United States or
Printz, commentators have recognized that the Court applied a more stringent standard than
"rational basis." See Thomas H. Odom & Gregory S. Feder, Challenging the Federal Driver's
Privacy Protection Act: The Next Step in Developing a Jurisprudence of Process-Oriented Feder-
alism Under the Tenth Amendment, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 71, 156-59 (1998).
82. See March D. Coleman, Comment, A Step Backwards: Carjacking and the Commerce
Clause, 16 J.L. & COM. 113, 128 (1996).
83. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
84. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(l)-(3) (1994).
85. Id. § 922(q)(1)(A).
86. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59.
87. Id. at 558. Examples of this include the statutes at issue in the Lottery Case and Darby,
which prohibited certain items from moving in interstate commerce altogether.
88. Id. This ranges from the power to set intrastate railroad rates in the Shreveport Rate
Cases, see Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914), to the power to
criminalize thefts from interstate shipments, see 18 U.S.C. § 659 (2000), to the power to criminal-
ize the destruction of any aircraft employed in interstate commerce, see id. § 32.
89. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59.
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cases as allowing Congress to reach only economic activity.90 This
brand new requirement 9 -the economic character of the regulated
activity-was the first basis on which the Court found fault with the
GFSZA: it was a criminal statute that did not regulate "commerce or
any sort of economic enterprise. '92 Because it was not an essential
part of a larger regulatory scheme that "could be undercut unless the
intrastate activity were regulated, ' 93 the GFSZA was not valid under
the substantial effects prong.94 The Court noted that the GFSZA con-
tained no "jurisdictional element" that would ensure that "the firearm
possession in question affects interstate commerce. ' 95 Finally, Con-
gress had offered no formal findings to help the Court see how gun
possession in school zones substantially affected interstate commerce
when the connection was not otherwise apparent. 96
The Government argued that gun possession in school zones sub-
stantially affected interstate commerce, not only because insurance
costs may spread interstate, 97 but also because school violence might
threaten the educational process and ultimately lead to a "less produc-
tive citizenry. '98 The Court noted that the "costs of crime" reasoning
would allow Congress to regulate all violent crime or activities "that
might lead to violent crime, regardless of how tenuously they relate to
interstate commerce." 99 And under the "national productivity" argu-
ment, Congress could regulate anything that might conceivably relate
to an individual's economic productivity, including family law or edu-
cation.' °° The Government's reasoning would leave the Court "hard
pressed to posit any activity by an individual that Congress is without
90. Id. at 559-60 (citing Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971) and Wickard v. Filburn,
317 U.S. 111 (1942)).
91. Indeed, the Court's consideration of the economic nature of the activity in Lopez was
almost directly contradictory to Wickard. See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125 (noting that even if Fil-
burn's activity "may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by
Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce" (emphasis added)).
92. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 (internal quotation marks omitted).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. The existence of a jurisdictional element-for example, limiting the scope of the GF-
SZA to possession of guns that had moved in interstate commerce-moves the analysis of a
statute from the substantial effects prong to one of the more lenient "channels" or "instrumen-
talities" prongs. See Diane McGimsey, Comment, The Commerce Clause and Federalism After
Lopez and Morrison: The Case for Closing the Jurisdictional-Element Loophole, 90 CAL. L.
REV. 1675, 1679-81 (2002).
96. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562-63.
97. Id. at 564.
98. Id. The decreased productivity, the Government argued, "would have an adverse effect
on the Nation's economic well-being." Id.
99. Id. (emphasis added).
100. Id.
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power to regulate,"'' 1 and would thus convert "the Commerce Clause
to a general police power of the sort retained by the States."' 0 2
Five years later, in United States v. Morrison,0 3 the Court invali-
dated a provision of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) 104
that created "a federal civil remedy for the victims of gender-moti-
vated violence."' 0 5 Reiterating its reasoning in Lopez, 10 6 the Court
identified four "significant considerations" that affected its judgment:
the economic nature of the activity;10 7 the presence of a jurisdictional
element;10 8 the existence of congressional findings;10 9 and whether the
link to commerce was "attenuated."'110 The Court suggested that
when the activity being regulated was not economic in nature, Con-
gress could not aggregate its effects to demonstrate a substantial im-
pact on commerce. 11' The VAWA failed on all four counts: gender-
motivated violence was not economic;11 2 the VAWA contained no "ju-
risdictional element" that could demonstrate how the legislation was
tied to interstate commerce;' 13 the findings were insufficient to uphold
the legislation;114 and the link between the regulated conduct and
commerce was as attenuated as that in Lopez. 1 5
Lopez and Morrison represented an unexpected shift in Commerce
Clause jurisprudence1 6 following over half a century during which the
Court did not invalidate any commerce legislation. 1 7 The Court's at-
titude towards Commerce Clause legislation marked a significant
change; the "rational basis" test of old' 18 seemed to have been re-
101. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564.
102. Id. at 567.
103. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
104. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2000).
105. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 601-02.
106. In fact, much of the Morrison opinion came from Lopez. See id. at 610-18.
107. Id. at 609-10.
108. Id. at 611-12.
109. Id. at 612.
110. Id.
111. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 614 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 n.2 (1995)). The Court
thought the findings were weak because they relied on reasoning that had been "rejected as
unworkable" in Lopez. Id. at 615.
115. Id.
116. Eric R. Claeys, The Living Commerce Clause: Federalism in Progressive Political Theory
and the Commerce Clause After Lopez and Morrison, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 403, 436
(2002).
117. See Kolenc, supra note 76, at 870 n.17.
118. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
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placed with a stricter, 19 four-part "considerations" test. 120 Because
the Lopez-Morrison test focused on the nature (economic or not) of
the activity at issue, the way the Court defined the activity took on
greater significance. 121 The Court seemed more willing to exert its
power to protect the boundaries of federalism 122 and less inclined to
abdicate its review and rely on political safeguards. 123 The question
was how long this trend would last.
III. SUBJECT OPINION: GONZALES V. RAICH
The Raich decision had been a long time coming. It was the latest
product of the decades-old struggle between federal legislators and
individuals over the legality of marijuana use.' 24 Recognition of that
struggle may well have factored into the Court's decision.' 25 This Part
recounts the background and application of the CSA and reviews the
Court's opinion in Raich.
A. Angel Raich and Diane Monson Take on the CSA
In 1970, Congress enacted the Controlled Substances Act (CSA),
which categorizes all "controlled substances" into five schedules.1 26
Marijuana is classified as a Schedule I substance, 27 meaning it has a
high potential for abuse and no safe or acceptable medicinal use.1 28
Because of this classification, the CSA prohibits the manufacture, dis-
tribution, or possession of marijuana. 29 Several efforts have been
made to transfer marijuana to a less restrictive schedule, but to no
avail.130
119. Christy H. Dral & Jerry J. Phillips, Commerce by Another Name: The Impact of United
States v. Lopez and United States v. Morrison, 68 TENN. L. REV. 605, 615-16 (2001).
120. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609.
121. Samantha Everett, Note, Raich v. Ashcroft: Medical Marijuana and the Revival of Feder-
alism, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1873, 1892 (2004).
122. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 569 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 580
("The [GFSZA] ... upsets the federal balance to a degree that renders it an unconstitutional
assertion of the commerce power, and our intervention is required." (emphasis added)); Michael
Keenan, Is United States v. Morrison Antidemocratic?: Political Safeguards, Deference, and the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 48 How. L.J. 267, 269 (2004).
123. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 616 n.7. But see id. at 649 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that
"the Constitution remits [conflicts of sovereign political interests implicated by the Commerce
Clause] to politics").
124. See infra notes 126-157 and accompanying text.
125. See infra notes 158-206 and accompanying text.
126. 21 U.S.C. § 812 (2000).
127. Id. § 812(c).
128. Id. § 812(b)(1).
129. Id. §§ 823(f), 844(a).
130. See, e.g., H.R. 2087, 109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005).
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In the years since the CSA was enacted, several states, including
California, have passed legislation legalizing marijuana for personal,
medicinal use under the supervision of a physician. 131 California's
Compassionate Use Act of 1996 (CUA) 132 provides that state laws re-
garding marijuana cultivation and possession do not apply to those
who possess or cultivate it for physician-recommended medicinal pur-
poses.' 33 Angel Raich and Diane Monson, two California residents,
began using marijuana for medicinal purposes pursuant to their doc-
tors' recommendations. 134 The women suffer from an unfathomable
range of physical maladies 35 that their physicians were unsuccessful
in treating with conventional medicine. 136 Both physicians recom-
mended the use of marijuana as an alternative. 137 Raich's physician
believed that denying her the use of marijuana for medicinal purposes
would prove fatal.' 38 Monson cultivated the marijuana herself, while
Raich's marijuana was provided by caregivers at no charge.' 39
On August 15, 2002, county deputy sheriffs, as well as Drug En-
forcement Agency (DEA) agents, arrived at Monson's home. 140 The
DEA agents, acting pursuant to the CSA, seized and destroyed all of
her marijuana plants.' 41 Raich and Monson brought suit, seeking an
injunction and declaratory judgment against enforcement of the CSA
on the grounds that, as applied to them, the CSA was an unconstitu-
tional exercise of the commerce power.142 The district court denied
their motion for a preliminary injunction, 143 finding that the women
could not show that they were likely to prevail on the merits.1 44
131. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 5 (2005).
132. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West Supp. 2006).
133. Id. § 11362.5(d).
134. Raich, 545 U.S. at 6-7.
135. Raich's own ailments include scoliosis, temporomandibular joint dysfunction, endometri-
osis, nonepileptic seizures, and an inoperable brain tumor. The symptoms include chronic pain,
life-threatening weight loss, nausea, and one episode of paralysis. Brief for Respondents at 4,
Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (No. 03-1454). Monson's condition is comparatively milder, limited to a degen-
erative disease of the spine, and the "chronic back pain and constant painful muscle spasms" that
accompany it. Id. at 5.
136. Raich, 545 U.S. at 7.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. Raich's ailments render her physically unable to cultivate her own marijuana. Id.
140. Id.
141. Raich, 545 U.S. at 7. The county officials determined that her possession was legal under
the CUA. Id.
142. Id. at 7-8. Raich and Monson also brought a substantive due process claim, which was
not addressed by the lower courts. Id.
143. Raich v. Ashcroft, 248 F. Supp. 2d 918, 931 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
144. Id.
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The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. 145 The CSA
applies to all marijuana possession.' 46 But the Ninth Circuit found
that as applied to Raich and Monson, the CSA was seeking to reach
"a separate and distinct class of activities," 147 namely "the intrastate,
noncommercial cultivation and possession of cannabis for personal
medical purposes as recommended by a patient's physician pursuant
to valid California state law."' 148 Relying on Lopez, the Ninth Circuit
found that such activity was not economic in nature; 49 thus, under
Morrison, it could not be aggregated to show a substantial impact on
commerce. 150 After noting the lack of a jurisdictional element, 151 the
absence of congressional findings specific to medicinal marijuana, 52
and what it deemed an attenuated connection to commerce, 153 the
Ninth Circuit found that the CSA was "likely unconstitutional" as ap-
plied to Raich and Monson.' 54
The Court granted certiorari. 155 The case presented an opportunity
for the Court to test its newfound scrutiny of commerce legislation
and further elucidate how the Court differentiates between economic
and noneconomic activity.' 56 It also presented an opportunity to see
whether the Court's past reliance on political safeguards, relegated to
the dissent in Morrison,157 would find favor with a majority once
again.
B. Your Winner, by Split Decision: The CSA
The Court upheld the CSA's application to Raich and Monson by a
6 to 3 vote. Justice John Paul Stevens wrote the Court's opinion. 158
Justice Antonin Scalia filed a concurring opinion,159 and Justices San-
dra Day O'Connor 60 and Clarence Thomas 6 each filed a dissent.
145. Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 2003).
146. 21 U.S.C. §§ 823(f), 844(a) (2000).
147. Raich, 352 F.3d at 1228 (emphasis omitted).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1230.
150. Id. at 1230-31.
151. Id. at 1231.
152. Id. at 1231-33.
153. Raich, 352 F.3d at 1233.
154. Id. at 1234.
155. 542 U.S. 936 (2004).
156. See Catherine Laughlin, U.S. Supreme Court Hears Oral Arguments in Ashcroft v. Raich
Background, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHics 396, 397 (2005).
157. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 649 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting).
158. See infra notes 162-185 and accompanying text.
159. See infra notes 186-195 and accompanying text.
160. See infra notes 196-206 and accompanying text.
161. See infra note 206.
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1. The Court's Opinion
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, held that "[t]he CSA is a
valid exercise of federal power, even as applied" to Raich and Mon-
son.1 62 The Court noted that Congress had enacted a "closed regula-
tory system making it unlawful to manufacture, distribute, dispense,
or possess any controlled substance" except in accordance with the
CSA's schedules. 163 The general validity of the CSA was not at issue;
rather, the challenge was limited to the CSA's prohibition on mari-
juana possession "as applied to the intrastate manufacture and posses-
sion of marijuana for medical purposes pursuant to California law."'164
Placing the case in the substantial effects prong of commerce legis-
lation,165 the Court noted that Congress has the power to regulate
"purely local" activities that are within the "class of activities that
have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. ' 166 Congress was
not required "to legislate with scientific exactitude"; if it determined
that the "total incidence of a practice" affected interstate commerce, it
could regulate the entire class.167
The Court likened the case to Wickard, noting that both the CSA
and the regulation in Wickard aimed to "control the supply and de-
mand" of fungible commodities-respectively, marijuana and
wheat. 168 In both cases, Congress had a rational basis for concluding
that the failure to regulate home-consumed products "would have a
substantial influence on price and market conditions."'' 69 As in Wick-
ard, Congress could similarly conclude that high demand could draw
homegrown marijuana into the interstate market, frustrating the fed-
eral interest in excluding marijuana from that market altogether. 70
The fact that Wickard dealt with the "protect[ion] and stabiliz[ation]"
162. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 9 (2005).
163. Id. at 13.
164. Id. at 15 (emphasis added).
165. Id. at 17.
166. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 151
(1971) and Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1942)).
167. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). When the regulation is substantially related to
commerce, "the de minimis character of individual instances arising under that statute is of no
consequence." Raich, 545 U.S. at 17 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Lopez v.
United States, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995)). For example, Wickard held that "Congress can regulate
purely intrastate [wheat production] that is not itself 'commercial,' in that it is not produced for
sale, if it concludes that failure to regulate that class of activity would undercut the regulation of
the interstate market in that commodity." Id. at 18.
168. Id. at 19.
169. Id.
170. Id.
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of the interstate market, as opposed to the eradication of it, was a
difference "of no constitutional import.' 71
One distinction raised by Raich and Monson between their case and
Wickard was that the record itself in Wickard illustrated the economic
impact of the aggregate production of wheat, whereas there was no
similar record supporting the cSA. 172 But the Court responded that
Congress had made findings in support of the CSA "to the same ef-
fect."'1 73 The Court noted that its task was not to determine whether
Raich and Monson's activities, in the aggregate, affect commerce, but
only whether Congress had a rational basis for so concluding. 174
Given the difficulty in distinguishing between marijuana grown in-
state or elsewhere, the Court could easily conclude that a rational ba-
sis existed for Congress's scheme. 175
The Court distinguished Lopez and Morrison,176 noting that the
challenges in those cases were facial challenges, not as-applied chal-
lenges. 177 Lopez and Morrison both involved statutes that did not
regulate economic activity, 178 but they recognized that legislation reg-
ulating economic activity that substantially affects commerce is law-
ful. 179  Lopez and Morrison "cast[] no doubt" on the CSA's
constitutionality, because the CSA regulated "quintessentially eco-
nomic" activity. 18°
The Court refused to narrow the relevant class of activities as the
Ninth Circuit had done.' 81 The CSA regulates marijuana for any pur-
pose; the fact that Raich and Monson were using it for medical rea-
sons could not "itself serve as a distinguishing factor.' 82 Placing
personal medicinal marijuana use outside federal authority would
171. Id. at 19 n.29.
172. Raich, 545 U.S. at 20.
173. Id. While Congress had not made findings specific to medicinal marijuana, it was not
generally required to do so. Id. at 21.
174. Id. at 22.
175. Id. Thus, regulation of local marijuana cultivation and possession was a valid exercise of
the power to make laws which are "necessary and proper to regulate Commerce ... among the
several States." Id. (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8).
176. Raich, 545 U.S. at 23-27.
177. Id. at 23. The Court found this distinction "pivotal" because if the class of activities being
regulated was within federal reach, the courts could not "excise, as trivial, individual instances"
of that class. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Perez, 402 U.S.
146, 154 (1971)).
178. Id. at 23-25.
179. Id. at 24-25.
180. Id. at 25. The Court relied on a dictionary definition of "economics" as "the production,
distribution, and consumption of commodities." Raich, 545 U.S. at 25.
181. Id. at 26-29.
182. Id. at 27.
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place any personal use of marijuana or any other drug outside federal
control, regardless of whether a state elects to regulate such use.8 3
Congress could have rationally concluded that such use would sub-
stantially impact commerce.184
Finally, Justice Stevens pointed out the alternatives available to
Raich and Monson. After identifying the procedures one could use to
reclassify a drug under the CSA, the Court noted that "perhaps even
more important than these legal avenues is the democratic process, in
which the voices of the voters allied with these respondents may one
day be heard in the halls of Congress.' 85
2. Justice Scalia's Concurrence
Justice Scalia filed a concurring opinion, offering a somewhat more
intricate explanation of the commerce power. He noted that "activi-
ties that substantially affect interstate commerce are not themselves
part of interstate commerce, and thus the power to regulate them can-
not come from the Commerce Clause alone. 18 6 That power comes
from the Necessary and Proper Clause187 and allows Congress to regu-
late two separate areas: (1) activities which substantially affect inter-
state commerce; and (2) activities which do not themselves
substantially affect interstate commerce but are necessary to effec-
tively regulate commerce. 88  Though the two powers often overlap,
they are distinct.'8 9 Justice Scalia thought Lopez rejected the conten-
tion that Congress can reach noneconomic activity through its attenu-
ated relation to commerce. 190 But such activity may be reached when
it is "an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity." 191
In such a case, the Court need only ask whether the means chosen are
183. Id. at 28. The Court noted that "[o]ne need not have a degree in economics to under-
stand why a nationwide exemption" for marijuana "cultivated for personal use ... may have a
substantial impact on the interstate market." Id.
184. Id. at 30. This was supported by the fact that, in the Court's opinion, the CUA was
"broad enough to allow even the most scrupulous doctor" to overprescribe, increasing the likeli-
hood that "unscrupulous people" would use the CUA for commercial ends. Raich, 545 U.S. at
31-32.
185. Id. at 33.
186. Id. at 34 (Scalia, J., concurring).
187. Id.
188. Id. at 34-35.
189. Id. at 37.
190. Raich, 545 U.S. at 35-36 (Scalia, J., concurring).
191. Id. at 36 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995)). Thus in Darby,
Congress had the power not only to exclude goods from commerce, but also to require produc-
ers of goods for interstate commerce to conform to wage and hours requirements, and to require
those producers to keep employment records to demonstrate compliance. Id. at 37.
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"reasonably adapted" to attaining a legitimate end.192 As applied to
the CSA, Justice Scalia thought the regulation of personal marijuana
possession was so adapted. 193 And although the Necessary and
Proper Clause is limited by principles of state sovereignty, 194 regulat-
ing areas traditionally left to the states did not violate those
principles. 95
3. Justice O'Connor's Dissent
Justice O'Connor dissented, noting that the Court "enforce[s] the
'outer limits' of Congress' Commerce Clause authority not for their
own sake, but to protect historic spheres of state sovereignty.' 1 96 In
upholding the CSA, the Court gave Congress "a perverse incentive to
legislate broadly," couching "questionable assertions of its authority
into comprehensive regulatory schemes. ' 197 By referring to the "es-
sential part of a larger regulation" language in Lopez, Justice
O'Connor thought the Court had converted that case into a "drafting
guide": if Congress legislates broadly enough, then the activities that
such legislation encompasses are within the commerce power's
reach. 198
To prevent Congress from intruding too far into state concerns, Jus-
tice O'Connor thought the Court should seek "objective markers" for
evaluating legislation, which "allow[ ] Congress to regulate more than
nothing... and less than everything. " 199 In this case, the CUA would
be such an objective marker.200 The Court should thus have evaluated
the CSA by sole reference to the "personal cultivation, possession,
and use of marijuana for medicinal purposes. ' 20 1
Justice O'Connor also thought the Court's definition of economic
was "breathtaking," encompassing production, distribution, and con-
192. Id.
193. Id. at 39-40.
194. Id. at 39.
195. Raich, 545 U.S. at 41-42 (Scalia, J., concurring).
196. Id. at 42 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
197. Id. at 43.
198. See id. at 44-46. Indeed, in applying Lopez and Morrison's four considerations, Justice
O'Connor found the CSA "materially indistinguishable" from the legislation at issue in those
cases. Id. at 45.
199. Id. at 47. In this regard, Justice O'Connor found fault with the Court for taking the CSA
at its face and relying on the fact that "Congress did not distinguish between various forms" of
marijuana use. Raich, 545 U.S. at 45 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
200. Id. at 48.
201. Id.
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sumption. 20 2 Lopez suggested that possession itself is not commer-
cial.20 3  Even assuming that Raich and Monson's activity was
economic, the Government did not show that their activities substan-
tially affected interstate commerce. 20 4 In Justice O'Connor's opinion,
Congress must offer "more than mere assertion" when attempting to
reach "local activity whose connection to an interstate market is not
self-evident. '20 5 Unlike Wickard, where the Court had before it a
summary of the economics of the wheat industry, the Government of-
fered only a series of "bare declarations. '20 6
IV. UNQUESTIONING DEFERENCE AND FAULTY SAFEGUARDS
The Court's treatment of the CSA's validity under the Commerce
Clause is troubling in several respects. The Court seemed unwilling to
engage in a true as-applied analysis or question the conclusory "find-
ings" offered by the Government in support of the CSA.20 7 And the
Court's doctrinal treatment is indicative of a reliance on political safe-
guards that may be misplaced, given the political and social contro-
versy surrounding marijuana in general.20 8
202. Id. at 49. The Court should not uphold federal regulation of noncommercial activity
simply because it affects the demand for commercial goods, since "[miost commercial goods or
services have some sort of privately producible analogue." Id.
203. Id. at 50. Further, Wickard did not support federal regulation of home consumption in
this case, because the regulation in Wickard exempted small plantings-it "did not extend [fed-
eral] authority to something as modest as the home cook's herb garden." Raich, 545 U.S. at 51
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
204. Id.
205. Id. at 52.
206. Id. at 54. The majority's own arguments justifying federal regulation were "plausible,"
but were not "borne out in fact." Id. at 56. Such a factual demonstration is required before
allowing federal regulation over such activity. Justice Thomas also filed a dissent, contending
that the Necessary and Proper Clause authorizes only means that are "plainly adapted" to effec-
tuating lawful regulation. Id. at 60 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Thus, "there must be an 'obvious,
simple, and direct relation' between the intrastate ban and the regulation of interstate com-
merce." Raich, 545 U.S. at 61 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S.
600, 613 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring)). Because the case was an as-applied challenge, there
must be "obvious and plain reasons why regulating intrastate cultivation" of medicinal marijuana
was necessary to effect an interstate ban; such reasons did not exist. Id. at 62 (internal quotation
marks omitted). Justice Thomas noted that the "scant evidence" that was available suggested
that few people even take advantage of the medicinal marijuana laws, and that such laws have
had little effect on law enforcement efforts. Id. at 63. Even assuming that regulation of medici-
nal marijuana use was "necessary," it was not "proper" because it violated principles of federal-
ism. Id. at 64-65.
207. See infra notes 209-261 and accompanying text.
208. See infra notes 262-298 and accompanying text.
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A. Commerce Clause Doctrine
Though it is difficult to find fault with the Court's application of
Commerce Clause doctrine in Raich, its analysis was not flawless. The
Court was unclear about whether it was upholding the CSA facially,
or as applied to Raich and Monson's specific activities. 209 And the
Court found a rational basis for the CSA's application to Raich and
Monson almost solely by taking Congress's word for it.210
1. The Court Called It an As-Applied Challenge, but Analyzed It as
a Facial Challenge
The Court purported to analyze the case as a challenge to the CSA
as applied to Raich and Monson's activities.211 But the Court's opin-
ion itself belies that notion. An analysis of the as-applied challenge in
this case should have involved determining whether the activity before
the Court-the medicinal use of homegrown marijuana-was com-
mercial, and thus could be considered in the aggregate. 212 That was
essentially what the Ninth Circuit did; it analyzed whether Raich and
Monson's conduct was part of a "separate class of activities" that was
beyond the reach of federal power. 213 But the Court rejected this ap-
proach, reasoning that Congress itself had rejected it in drafting the
CSA. 214 As such, it upheld the application of the CSA to Raich and
Monson by the same justifications that supported its application to
any intrastate activity, "economic" or not.215
209. See infra notes 211-220 and accompanying text.
210. See infra notes 221-261 and accompanying text.
211. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 15 (characterizing the case as a challenge to the CSA "as applied to
the intrastate manufacture and possession of marijuana for medical purposes pursuant to Cali-
fornia law" (emphasis added)). Any doubt about the type of challenge the Court believed it
addressed was extinguished by the manner in which the Court distinguished Lopez and Morri-
son. It pointed out that those cases involved facial challenges, whereas Raich was an attempt to
"excise individual applications" of the CSA. Id. at 23. An as-applied challenge claims that the
activity or product at issue, although technically within the class of activities being regulated, is
so different from the rest of the class that the justifications for regulating the class do not specifi-
cally apply. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153-54 (1938); Gillian E.
Metzger, Facial Challenges and Federalism, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 905-06 (2005).
212. See Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court's Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 138
(2004). Since Morrison seemed to limit the aggregation principle to economic activity, see
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000), defining the conduct at issue as noneconomic
would preclude aggregation, and the question would become whether the challenger's specific
instance of activity substantially affected interstate commerce. See Metzger, supra note 211, at
930 n.252.
213. See Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1229 (9th Cir. 2003).
214. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 27.
215. See id. at 26-27.
2007] GONZALES V. RAICH
This treatment seems to stem from the Court's categorization of the
CSA as a "comprehensive regulatory regime," 21 6 from which the
Court "refuse[d] to excise individual components. 2 1 7 Essentially, the
Court would not analyze subclasses of activities that the CSA regu-
lated. Rather than determining whether Raich and Monson's specific
activities218 were within federal reach, the Court addressed the CSA's
reach into any intrastate activity.21 9 In doing so, the Court analyzed
the case much as it would a facial challenge, strongly suggesting that
as-applied challenges would not receive a warm welcome in the Com-
merce Clause context.220
2. The Record: The Court Needed More Facts Before Upholding
Intrastate Regulation
Also suspect is the Court's satisfaction with the record and the Gov-
ernment's support for the CSA. The Court disposed of the case in
large part by referring to Wickard, which it felt was nearly indistin-
guishable.221 But there are a number of distinctions between the CSA
and the Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA)2 22 at issue in Wickard
that the Court essentially ignored. In Wickard, the parties "stipulated
[to] a summary of the economics of the wheat industry. ' 223 In deter-
mining that Congress could have concluded that home-consumed
216. Id. at 27.
217. Id. at 22.
218. Their specific activities were the "intrastate manufacture and possession of marijuana for
medical purposes pursuant to California law." Id. at 15.
219. See id. at 22 ("Congress had a rational basis for believing that failure to regulate the
intrastate manufacture and possession of marijuana would leave a gaping hole in the CSA.").
220. The Court actually distinguished its decisions in Lopez and Morrison on this ground. See
supra note 211. Noting that Raich and Monson were asking the Court to "excise individual
applications of a concededly valid statutory scheme," the Court characterized Lopez and Morri-
son as involving the assertion that "a particular statute or provision fell outside Congress' com-
merce power in its entirety." Raich, 545 U.S. at 23. When considered with the rest of the
Court's opinion, this logic seems to foreclose as-applied challenges to Commerce Clause legisla-
tion, at least where there is a "comprehensive scheme" involved; if the statute is facially valid, its
validity as applied to subclasses of conduct will not be questioned. Although this issue is beyond
the scope of this Note, the question of as-applied challenges to commerce regulations has been a
subject of ongoing debate. See, e.g., United States v. Stewart, 348 F.3d 1132, 1140-42 (9th Cir.
2003) (concluding that as-applied challenges are available in the Commerce Clause context).
Compare United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114, 1133 (9th Cir. 2003) (invalidating federal child
pornography laws as applied to "non-commercial, non-economic, simple intrastate possession of
photographs for personal use"), with id. at 1133 (Trott, J., dissenting) (concluding that the Su-
preme Court had precluded as-applied Commerce Clause challenges, and that "if the conduct
under review falls within the plain language of the statute, precedent requires [courts] to take
the statute head on, not carve pieces out of it").
221. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 17-24.
222. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1281, 1339 (2000).
223. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942).
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wheat had a "substantial effect" on efforts to stabilize the wheat in-
dustry, the Court looked to "the actual effects" of Filburn's activity,
which had been established by the record. 224 In support of the CSA,
however, the Court merely considered Congress's "findings... to the
same effect" that "[l]ocal ... possession of controlled substances con-
tribute[s] to swelling the interstate traffic in such substances. 225 The
Court essentially implied that unsupported assertions are as adequate
a means of demonstrating the propriety of regulations as a detailed
economic report. Though the Court said that Congress had a rational
basis for bringing home-consumed marijuana within its reach,226 it is
not so clear whether that was the case. Is "we find that X substantially
affects commerce because we find that X substantially affects com-
merce" a rational basis?227 Perhaps the Court was really applying
something more akin to a "good story" test: if Congress can come up
with a good story supporting the regulation of a particular activity,
that will suffice, notwithstanding an absence of factual support.
Another distinction between the CSA and the AAA may be found
in the different objectives of the regulations. The AAA sought to sta-
bilize and protect the interstate wheat market, whereas the CSA seeks
to suppress the interstate marijuana market entirely. The Court dis-
missed this distinction as being "of no constitutional import" because
Congress has the power to pursue either objective.228 While this may
be true,229 it does not mean the record that is required to uphold each
type of legislation should be identical. When Congress sought to sta-
bilize and protect the interstate wheat market, a major reason for up-
holding the regulation of intrastate wheat consumption was that such
activity could affect Congress's aim without ever crossing state lines.230
Empirical data was relatively unnecessary in this context, as it
presented something akin to a "zero-sum" situation: as more wheat
was produced and consumed at home, the total demand for wheat in
interstate commerce necessarily decreased. 231
224. Id. at 120 (emphasis added).
225. Raich, 545 U.S. at 20, 12 n.20 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 801(4) (2000)).
226. Id. at 19.
227. Justice O'Connor did not seem to think so, noting that "if the Court today is right about
what passes rationality review before us, then our decision in Morrison should have come out
the other way," since the VAWA was supported by numerous "findings." Id. at 54 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
228. Id. at 19 n.29 (majority opinion).
229. See, e.g., Wickard, 317 U.S. 111; The Lottery Case, 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
230. See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 128.
231. Indeed, the Wickard Court came to this conclusion without referring to any empirical
data. See id. (noting that homegrown wheat "supplies a need of the man who grew it which
would otherwise be reflected by purchases in the open market"). Only the empirical data re-
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By contrast, a more detailed showing may be appropriate when
Congress is attempting to suppress an entire interstate market, as with
the CSA. The Court suggested three "visions" or purposes for the
CSA: (1) to eradicate interstate transactions in marijuana;232 (2) to
limit the supply of marijuana, and thereby drive up the market
price;233 and (3) to eradicate marijuana transactions by driving up the
market price (in other words, to achieve (1) through (2)).234 If (2)
were an accurate description of the CSA's goals (if Congress really
just wanted to stabilize the market price of marijuana), then the situa-
tion would be precisely the same as in Wickard; intrastate marijuana
growth and consumption would have the same effect on market condi-
tions as Filburn's wheat consumption. But affecting market prices is
not the aim of the CSA, at least with regard to marijuana-simple
possession of marijuana is a criminal offense. 235 Therefore, Wickard is
not directly analogous. The fact that the CSA attempts to completely
prohibit marijuana should have changed the Court's analysis to some
extent.
Consider purpose (1), the eradication of the interstate market for
marijuana. Here, Congress's ostensible aim is to prohibit a commod-
ity from traveling in interstate commerce. Therefore, intrastate activ-
ity-whether production, distribution, or consumption-cannot, by
definition, frustrate Congress's goal unless and until it crosses state
lines. The Raich Court offered several explanations of why locally
grown marijuana could enter interstate commerce, including the high
interstate demand for the substance.2 36 But even if one accepts the
arguable likelihood that homegrown marijuana could enter the inter-
state market, such a conjecture hardly compels the conclusion that
garding the specific levels of homegrown wheat consumption were important to the Court's deci-
sion in that case. See id. at 127.
232. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 19 n.29 ("To be sure . . . the marijuana market is an unlawful
market that Congress sought to eradicate.").
233. See id. at 18-19 ("Just as the [AAA] was designed 'to control the volume [of wheat]
moving in interstate and foreign commerce' . . . and consequently control the market price, a
primary purpose of the CSA is to control the supply and demand of controlled substances in
both lawful and unlawful drug markets." (second alteration in original) (quoting Wickard, 317
U.S. at 115)).
234. See id. at 19 ("[Olne concern prompting inclusion of wheat grown for home consumption
in the [AAA] was that rising market prices could draw such wheat into the interstate market,
resulting in lower market prices. The parallel concern making it appropriate to include mari-
juana grown for home consumption in the CSA is the likelihood that the high demand in the
interstate market will draw such marijuana into that market." (citations omitted)).
235. 21 U.S.C. §§ 812(c), 823(f)
, 844(a) (2000).
236. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 19.
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homegrown marijuana will affect interstate commerce. 237 In Wickard,
the effect on interstate commerce was evident even without support-
ing. data; the zero-sum nature of the supply-demand relation com-
pelled the Court's conclusion.238 In terms of the CSA, however, it is
impossible to say with any degree of certainty whether homegrown
marijuana will actually enter the interstate market, at least without
some statistical showing to that effect. 239 Given the vast amount of
statistical data that the government compiles about drug use and ar-
rests,240 it seems rational to require some factual showing of home-
grown marijuana's effect on interstate commerce. This showing is
particularly appropriate when the regulation is attempting to reach
wholly intrastate activity and threatening to alter "the distribution of
power fundamental to our federalist system of government. '241
Justice Scalia's concurrence attempted to obviate the need for such
findings, arguing that while intrastate medicinal marijuana use may
not substantially affect commerce in and of itself, the regulation of
such use was necessary and proper for the government's legitimate
regulation of interstate commerce. 242 But if a law is not "proper"
when it violates state sovereignty, 243 as the Court has recognized, it is
difficult to see why this distinction makes a difference. If the Court is
indeed concerned with protecting "the Constitution's distinction be-
tween national and local authority,"'244 it should demand some factual
justification before upholding federal regulation of intrastate activity,
whatever the constitutional authority may be. The Government of-
fered no more evidence that regulating Raich and Monson's activities
237. In fact, there is an equally strong, equally conjecturable argument that homegrown mari-
juana will decrease the amount moving interstate. Raich and Monson acknowledged a willing-
ness to purchase marijuana in interstate commerce to meet their needs. Id. at 18 n.28. If they
were allowed to continue cultivating their own, they would have no need to resort to the inter-
state market, and the overall amount moving in interstate commerce would therefore decrease.
238. See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
239. Justice O'Connor recognized as much in her dissent, noting that "[tihe Government has
not overcome empirical doubt that the number of Californians engaged in personal cultivation,
possession, and use of medical marijuana, or the amount of marijuana they produce, is enough to
threaten the federal regime." Raich, 545 U.S. at 56 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
240. See, e.g., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE, http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook (last visited Jan. 19,
2007) [hereinafter SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS].
241. Raich, 545 U.S. at 42 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
242. See id. at 34-35 (Scalia, J., concurring). It is not so clear that the majority relied on this
distinction, framing the issue as whether Congress had a rational basis for concluding that "re-
spondents' activities, taken in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce." Id. at 22
(majority opinion) (emphasis added). Was the Court referring to Raich and Monson's specific
activities, or to marijuana cultivation and possession in general?
243. Id. at 39 (Scalia, J., concurring).
244. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615 (2000).
[Vol. 56:759
GONZALES V. RAICH
was "necessary" than it did to show that those activities substantially
affected interstate commerce. Thus, the "good story" justification
simply becomes "we find that regulating X is 'necessary to effectuate'
regulating Y because we find that regulating X is 'necessary to effectu-
ate' regulating Y."
Adopting vision (3) is another way of reducing the utility of empiri-
cal evidence by analogizing the operation of the CSA to that of the
AAA in Wickard. The Court noted that the AAA had controlled in-
trastate wheat production in an effort to prop up and stabilize market
prices. 245 Similarly, the Court said that the CSA was meant to "con-
trol the supply and demand of controlled substances" in interstate
commerce. 246 The argument was that the CSA, by completely sup-
pressing intrastate marijuana manufacture, artificially drives up the
price of marijuana beyond what the interstate market will bear,
thereby indirectly suppressing the interstate market itself.247 In that
sense, the Court reasoned, the CSA's regulation of "price and market
conditions" operated much like the AAA in Wickard.248 As such, the
effect of Raich and Monson's activities on interstate commerce, much
like Filburn's in Wickard, might be ascertainable without empirical
data on the record and might justify the Court's reliance on con-
clusory "findings" in upholding the CSA.
But even this characterization of the CSA is unpersuasive in ex-
plaining why the Court did not demand a stronger statistical showing
from the Government. First, it strains credulity to suggest that the
CSA is regulating the price of a commodity that it seeks to prohibit
altogether.249 Second, it is questionable whether such a scheme is
even rational; if the CSA successfully suppressed all intrastate mari-
juana cultivation, then the price of marijuana would (under the Gov-
ernment's theory) increase to the point of extinguishing interstate
transactions in the substance. But then there would be no demand,
and the price of marijuana would fall again-just as it would if the
intrastate cultivation was not suppressed-and interstate marijuana
245. Raich, 545 U.S. at 17.
246. Id. at 19.
247. This argument, while not specifically articulated by the Court, was raised by the Govern-
ment at oral argument. See Transcript of Oral Argument at *18, Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (No. 03-1454),
2004 WL 2845980 [hereinafter Transcript].
248. Raich, 545 U.S. at 19.
249. It could be argued that Congress's goal-to prohibit commerce in marijuana alto-
gether-does not affect the validity of the supply-demand theory of the CSA, because the Court
no longer asks whether there is a "pretext" for congressional action. See United States v. Darby,
312 U.S. 100, 113 (1941). But in terms of the CSA, there is no question of a hidden pretext-the
statute itself outlaws marijuana trafficking. The question is merely whether it is rational for
Congress to regulate by statute the price and market conditions of a market it seeks to eradicate.
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commerce would increase. It hardly seems "rational" to implement a
system of suppression that will eventually achieve the same result that
nonsuppression would achieve-low market prices for marijuana.250
The Court was unclear about which "vision" of the CSA it found
rational, and with good reason-none of them are supportable absent
some empirical data. Despite all these reasons for making Congress
"show its work," the Court simply accepted that Raich and Monson's
activities substantially affected interstate commerce, or that regulation
of their activities was necessary to effectuate the CSA (it did not re-
ally seem to care which). The Court did so despite the absence of any
statistical support for those assertions.25 1 In fact, the only evidence on
the record suggested that medicinal marijuana laws had "little impact"
on law enforcement activities.252
One may ask why this is problematic. If intrastate marijuana pos-
session (just like the wheat in Wickard) may be reached by Congress,
why is it constitutional to regulate it in one way (for stabilization of
the market price) and not in another (for eradication of the market)?
The answer is doctrinal: the Court requires at least a "rational basis"
for commerce regulation, and the structure of the CSA is simply not
rational. But more importantly, some limitations on federal power
must be fixed by the judiciary; otherwise, individuals ultimately suffer
as a result.253
Some commentators advocate that courts show more deference to
Congress and discourage the insistence on factual support for legisla-
tion.254 One argument for deference is based on pragmatic concerns,
such as the idea that because the Court showed so much deference to
Congress for most of the mid-twentieth century, legislators making
laws during that time would not have developed records to prepare
for the Court's demands for factual findings in cases like Lopez. 255
250. This may be why the Court had such a hard time discussing the "market price" theory
with a straight face. See Transcript, supra note 247, at *32-33.
251. The only statistical data cited by the Court was the amount of marijuana that the CUA
allowed patients to possess. Raich, 545 U.S. at 31 n.41. But nothing the Court cited pertained to
its likelihood to move in interstate commerce.
252. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MARIJUANA: EARLY EXPERIENCES WITH FOUR STATES'
LAWS THAT ALLOW USE FOR MEDICAL PURPOSES 32 (2002) (cited in Raich, 545 U.S. at 63
(Thomas, J., dissenting)), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03189.pdf. The report,
which was based on interviews with federal and local law enforcement officials, also noted that
none of the federal officials interviewed had indicated that medicinal marijuana laws-including
those in California-were being abused. See id. at 36.
253. See infra notes 320-333 and accompanying text.
254. See, e.g., William W. Buzbee & Robert A. Schapiro, Legislative Record Review, 54 STAN.
L. REV. 87 (2001); Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 80
(2001).
255. Colker & Brudney, supra note 254, at 105-11.
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Another argument attacks the Court's need for factual support for
legislation as being "rooted in an illegitimate judicial distrust of Con-
gress" 256 and contrary to separation of powers principles. 257 But this
Note contends that such arguments are unconvincing. First, to the ex-
tent that these arguments rely on the political safeguards of federal-
ism,25 8 they rest on a premise that may itself be suspect-that the
political process is an adequate substitute for judicial scrutiny.2 59 Sec-
ond, a little "judicial distrust of Congress" may be a good thing in
some contexts. As a way of setting limits on federal actions, "the Con-
stitution gives courts both the power and duty to determine whether
acts of Congress have exceeded [its] enumerated powers. '260 While it
may be undesirable to allow courts to scrutinize Congress's policy rea-
sons for legislating, "deference to congressional judgment as to its
power to legislate under the Commerce Clause is inappropriate" and
"incompatible with the system of checks and balances crafted by the
Framers. "261
B. The Court's Reliance on Political Safeguards
The Court's treatment of the as-applied analysis, the factually inad-
equate record, and the less-than-rational scheme of regulation all indi-
cate its reliance on political safeguards. The Court itself subtly
acknowledged this reliance. In response to concerns that its decision
in Raich might encourage Congress to legislate broadly, the Court
noted the "political checks" that would prevent Congress from "en-
act[ing] a broad and comprehensive scheme for the purpose of target-
ing purely local activity. '262 As an alternative to judicial relief, the
Court advised Raich and Monson that their best recourse "is the dem-
ocratic process, in which the voices of voters" may be heard by Con-
gress.263 The Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence has often
relied on the political safeguards theory and, with the exception of a
handful of cases, the Court has been content to leave federalism in the
hands of politicians. 264
256. Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 254, at 160.
257. See id. at 160; Colker & Brudney, supra note 254, at 144.
258. See Colker & Brudney, supra note 254, at 144.
259. See infra notes 262-298 and accompanying text.
260. David G. Wille, The Commerce Clause: A Time for Reevaluation, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1069,
1089 (1996).
261. Id. at 1091 (emphasis added).
262. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 25 n.34 (2005).
263. Id. at 33.
264. See supra notes 64-82 and accompanying text.
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But it is not so clear that the Court's reliance on political safeguards
is well founded. There have been many criticisms of the theory, and
the problems with relying on Congress to represent the states are illus-
trated by the CSA. 265 And while some argue that the state political
systems provide another level of protection, the passage of the CSA
suggests that even state governments are not always interested in
maintaining the federal balance. 266
1. Flaws in the System Undermine the Role of Federal Politics as a
Safeguard of Federalism
There have been many reasons proffered as to why the political
process may be an ineffective guardian of federalism. Federal officials
want to appear responsive to their constituencies and may try to effect
this aim by "providing desired services themselves-through the fed-
eral government-rather than [giving] or shar[ing] credit with state of-
ficials. '267 If state interests that are represented by a majority in
Congress happen to concur, "interests in the rest of the country will be
subordinated. '268 These results may not be problematic with respect
to legislation that Congress is constitutionally empowered to enact,
because the Constitution does not demand unanimous congressional
approval for legislation. But if one accepts that there is an abstract
limit on federal power imposed by the Constitution and principles of
federalism,269 then flaws in the political safeguards in a given case
would reinstate the need for judicial scrutiny. From time to time, par-
ticular flaws have caused the Court to engage in such review. 270
265. See infra notes 267-284 and accompanying text.
266. See infra notes 285-298 and accompanying text.
267. Kramer, supra note 9, at 1511 (emphasis added). For example, Congressman A, whose
constituency (State A) wants a prohibition on marijuana, will want to respond. Since Congress-
man A can act only on a federal level, his only available response would be a federal ban on
marijuana-like the CSA.
268. Id. Thus, if the constituencies of states B, C, and D (and their congresspeople) also seek
a marijuana prohibition, the CSA will pass, and those states who do not wish to prohibit mari-
juana will be foreclosed from obtaining that marijuana on the interstate market (or at all, as with
the actual CSA).
269. At least one of the Framers held this view: Thomas Jefferson believed that Congress
should be strictly limited to its enumerated powers, expanded by the Necessary and Proper
Clause only to "means without which the grant of power would be nugatory." Christopher J.
Parosa, Comment, Federalism: Finding Meaning Through Historical Analysis, 82 OR. L. REV.
119, 134-35 (2003) (quoting THOMAS JEFFERSON, Opinion on the Constitutionality of a National
Bank (Feb. 15, 1791), in THOMAS JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 416, 419 (Merrill D. Peterson ed.,
1984)).
270. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144 (1992).
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One such situation is where there is a danger of obscuring or inter-
fering with political accountability.2 71 The Court has been wary of
federal action that reduces the ability of the people to know which
government to hold accountable for a given action.2 72 The CSA, par-
ticularly in the case of medicinal marijuana, presents a similar prob-
lem. Every state has laws that prohibit the recreational use of
marijuana.2 73 That the CSA and various state laws overlap is evi-
denced by the Raich case itself-Monson was investigated for her ma-
rijuana possession by both federal and state agents. 274  Such
overlapping jurisdiction makes it difficult for voters to determine
which authority is regulating them in a given realm.275 Marijuana is a
perfect example. When Raich was decided, at least nine states had
enacted laws legalizing some form of medicinal marijuana use.276
Eight of these states had adopted the laws through the use of a ballot
initiative.277 This method of action offers a rare opportunity to ob-
serve how voters perceive the authority to which they are subject. By
adjusting these laws, voters apparently wanted to exempt medicinal
marijuana users from prosecution and thought that altering state law
would be sufficient. It is hard to believe that the citizens in these
states would go to the trouble of proposing the medicinal marijuana
exemptions, garnering support for them, and voting them into law, all
the while knowing that their efforts would be usurped by federal au-
thorities. These voters thought (albeit mistakenly) that they were ef-
fecting a change in the laws of the government that was responsible-
and accountable-for enforcing marijuana laws in their state. If
problems with accountability trigger the Court to supplement political
safeguards, 278 it is difficult to see why the Court so readily took the
Government at its word in Raich.
271. "Accountability," for purposes of this Note, refers to "the ability of one actor to demand
an explanation or justification of another actor for its actions and to reward or punish that sec-
ond actor on the basis of its performance or its explanation." Edward Rubin, The Myth of
Accountability and the Anti-administrative Impulse, 103 MicH. L. REV. 2073, 2073 (2005).
272. See supra notes 75-82 and accompanying text.
273. NORML: State by State Laws, http://www.norml.org/index.cfm?Group-lD=4516 (last
visited Jan. 19, 2007). The severity of these laws varies widely from state to state, with some
states (such as Texas) imposing a $1,000 fine and up to one year in jail for possession of less than
two ounces of marijuana, and others (such as Alaska) imposing no penalty or sanction whatso-
ever for less than four ounces. Id.
274. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 7 (2005).
275. See Rubin, supra note 271, at 2086-87.
276. Raich, 545 U.S. at 5.
277. See K.K. DuVivier, State Ballot Initiatives in the Federal Preemption Equation: A Medical
Marijuana Case Study, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 221, 223 & n.12 (2005). Ballot initiatives allow
citizens to place legislation on the ballot by petition, for voter approval. Id. at 221 n.2.
278. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 957 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Another flaw in the political safeguards is exposed by "public
choice" theory. This theory suggests that small, well-defined interest
groups with specific, intense goals will be disproportionately effective
in influencing politics and legislation. 279 There are numerous organi-
zations that lobby to maintain federal antidrug laws; several of them
supported the Government in Raich.280 Unlike states wishing to pro-
tect their boundaries from lottery tickets, the interests of these groups
do not stop at state lines; their goals are not concerned with "federal-
ism" at all.28' Many of these groups are actually staunch supporters of
the federal regulation of intrastate drug use. These groups will find a
ready ear in federal legislators (or at least those legislators who want
to be reelected). 28 2 The case of medicinal marijuana is, again, a per-
fect example: surveys show that a vast majority of Americans favor
legalizing marijuana for medicinal purposes. 283 Despite this fact, nu-
merous proposals in Congress to legalize medicinal marijuana have
279. See Samuel Issacharoff, Polarized Voting and the Political Process: The Transformation
of Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1833, 1884-86 (1992). This stems not only from
the difficulty in mobilizing a large group to political action, but also from the lack of intensity
with which members of a large, diffuse group may support a common position. Id. at 1185-86.
Professor Issacharoff uses the example of gun control:
Surveys routinely show that a majority of Americans favors some form of gun control.
Nonetheless, that broad majority is unable to organize itself and is unable to deliver
votes on the basis of intensity of preference on the issue of gun control alone. Politi-
cians may vote against gun control yet secure the support of gun-control backers on
other issues. By contrast, opponents of gun control, organized in a well-disciplined
group through the National Rifle Association, will be informed of the position of any
candidate on the gun control question and will vote against pro-gun control candidates
on that issue alone. As a result, candidates can be assured of few guaranteed votes
based on a pro-gun control plank but will assuredly lose a significant number of votes
because of such a position. Thus, despite majority sentiment in favor of regulation, the
smaller, well-organized gun lobby is able to exert disproportionate influence in the po-
litical process and thwart attempts at regulation.
Id. (citations omitted). This is, admittedly, a small fraction of the larger, more complex idea of
"public choice," which is beyond the scope of this discussion. For a comprehensive exposition,
see GORDON TULLOCK ET AL., GOVERNMENT: WHOSE OBEDIENT SERVANT? A PRIMER IN PUB-
LIC CHOICE (2000).
280. The Drug Free America Foundation, Drug Free Schools Coalition, Save Our Society
from Drugs, and Students Taking Action Not Drugs co-authored an amicus brief supporting the
CSA. Brief of the Drug Free America Foundation, Inc. et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioner, Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (No. 03-1454).
281. It has even been suggested that, following the repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment,
alcohol manufacturers lobbied for federal marijuana prohibition, as marijuana was viewed as
cheaper competition for alcohol. See Ronald Timothy Fletcher, Note, The Medical Necessity
Defense and De Minimis Protection for Patients Who Would Benefit from Using Marijuana for
Medical Purposes: A Proposal to Establish Comprehensive Protection Under Federal Drug Laws,
37 VAL. U. L. REV. 983, 990 (2003).
282. See Issacharoff, supra note 279 and accompanying text.
283. In 2003, 75% of Americans advocated such legalization. SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 240, tbl.2.69, http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t269.pdf.
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been unsuccessful. 28 4 This is an obvious case of the political safe-
guards failing. Representatives in Congress, far from being concerned
with protecting federalist lines, are not even concerned with advanc-
ing the will of their state's majority. The extent to which Congress
serves federalism is determined by the extent to which federalism can
sway votes. Where the political process is safeguarding special inter-
ests, and not federalism, it may be appropriate for the Court to engage
in a more searching review of the "necessity" of the regulation.
2. State Governments Will Not Protect the Federal Balance Against
Their Own Interests
Even despite some recognized flaws in the political safeguards the-
ory, it has been supported by reference to another level of protection
for the states-state governments themselves. If Congress over-
reaches the limits on its power at the expense of the states, state gov-
ernments-which are, theoretically, closer to their constituencies than
the federal government-can "rally opposition" among state re-
sidents, and thus eventually restore the federal balance. 285 But as the
situation with the CSA illustrates, it is not altogether clear that state
governments (or even the constituents themselves) will oppose every
intrusive federal action. It is important to consider the existing public
opinion on the subject of the legislation as well as the fact that politi-
cians try to be responsive to that opinion.28 6 Between 1972 (the CSA
was enacted in 1970) and 2003, polls show that anywhere from 62%
to 81% of Americans favored the prohibition of marijuana. 287 And
voter support for prohibition on a state level arose long before the
CSA, with the first state banning marijuana in 1913.288 Regardless of
whether it was within federal power, a majority of Americans wanted
marijuana prohibited on a state level, and their state governments
responded.
The CSA, by criminalizing marijuana at the federal level, gave the
federal government jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute individu-
284. To be more accurate, such bills, which have attempted to reclassify marijuana under the
CSA, have been referred to House subcommittees and have never been heard from again. See,
e.g., H.R. 912, 106th Cong. (1st Sess. 1999); H.R. 1782, 105th Cong. (1st Sess. 1997). A similar
bill was most recently introduced-and referred to subcommittee-in May of 2005. See H.R.
2087, 109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005).
285. See Kramer, supra note 8, at 257-65.
286. See Issacharoff, supra note 279, at 1884-86.
287. SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 240, tbl.2.67, http://www.
albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t267.pdf. This opinion long preceded the passage of the CSA; the
first poll, conducted one year before the enactment of the CSA, showed the highest level of
support for prohibition, 84%, of any year of polling. Id.
288. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 5 (2005).
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als possessing or cultivating marijuana.28 9 The DEA, which was cre-
ated within the Department of Justice in 1973,290 immediately began
to enforce the CSA, including the marijuana ban. The creation of the
DEA added an initial 1470 special agents, and nearly seventy-five mil-
lion dollars in funding, to the states' existing resources for prosecuting
marijuana possession, all dedicated to narcotics enforcement. 29' By
2003, those numbers had risen to nearly 5000 DEA special agents, and
nearly two billion dollars in funding.292 The DEA has seized 5,301,258
kilograms-nearly twelve million pounds-of marijuana since 1986.293
And over the past ten years, the DEA has arrested over 81,000 people
for marijuana violations. 294 In addition, federal jurisdiction over mari-
juana has allowed for the creation of the Domestic Cannabis Eradica-
tion/Suppression Program (DCE/SP), through which the DEA
provides "training, equipment, investigative and aircraft resources" to
participating state and local law enforcement agencies.295 Working
with these agencies, the DCE/SP was responsible in 2004 for eradicat-
ing over three million cultivated marijuana plants, for seizing over one
hundred thousand pounds of processed marijuana, and for arresting
over 8000 people for marijuana distribution. 296
What does all this mean? It means that state and local govern-
ments, as well as their constituents, have strong incentives to favor a
law like the CSA that gives the federal government jurisdiction over
intrastate marijuana possession. The DEA itself takes millions of
289. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 844(a) (2000). In fact, until 1968, the only federal agency in-
volved in regulating marijuana trafficking-the Bureau of Narcotics-was part of the Depart-
ment of the Treasury, and oversaw the collection of taxes on marijuana pursuant to the
Marihuana Tax Act, Pub. L. 75-238, 50 Stat. 551 (repealed 1970). U.S. Drug Enforcement Ad-
ministration, Inside the DEA, Genealogy, http://www.dea.gov/agency/genealogy.htm (last visited
Jan. 19, 2007).
290. U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, DEA History Book, 1970-1975, http://www.dea.
gov/pubs/history/1970-1975.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2007). The DEA was intended to consoli-
date CSA enforcement efforts from the former Office for Drug Abuse Law Enforcement and
Office of National Narcotics Intelligence.
291. Id.
292. U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, DEA History Book, 1999-2003, http://www.dea.
gov/pubs/history/1999-2003.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2007).
293. U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, DEA, Statistics, http://www.dea.gov/statistics.
html (last visited Jan. 19, 2007).
294. SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 240, tbl.4.40, http://www.
albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t440.pdf.
295. Id. tbl.4.38.2004, http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t4382004.pdf. The DCE/SP pro-
vides a limited amount of direct funding to state and local law enforcement agencies as well. But
because the issues involved in the federal government's exercise of the spending power are
somewhat different, this Note focuses on incentives in the form of the nonliquid resources the
program offers.
296. Id.
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pounds of marijuana off the streets, and the DCE/SP gives local law
enforcement agencies the resources to assist in those efforts. Thus,
the aforementioned majority of citizens that favor marijuana prohibi-
tion see that goal realized on a local level, either by the DEA (whose
funding comes from taxes diffused across the country) or from their
state or local law enforcement agencies (whose efforts are subsidized
by access to federal resources and investigative technology). State
and local governments, anxious to appease voters decrying recrea-
tional marijuana use in their communities, are not only able to point
to the thousands of marijuana-related arrests each year and the ac-
companying marijuana seizures, but they are able to do so without
imposing unpopular tax increases on their constituents or taking
money away from education and other programs. 297 Everybody wins,
in large part because the CSA allows the federal government to be
involved in drug enforcement on a local level.
The CSA may or may not be constitutional; it is not the goal of this
Note to make that determination. But assuming arguendo that the
CSA is unconstitutional, who is going to oppose it? Not Congress, if it
was enacted in response to pressures from special interests. 298 Not
state governments, so long as they are reaping the benefits of meeting
public demands at little cost. And not the citizenry itself, as long as
recreational drugs are kept off the streets without significant tax in-
creases. If the CSA offends the federal balance, it does so by means
of an "end around" the political safeguards.
V. FEDERAL POWER UNCHECKED, FEDERALISM'S
BENEFITS UNREALIZED
The Court's decision in Raich could very well have a substantial
impact on the Commerce Clause landscape. The apparent abrogation
of as-applied challenges, combined with the further development of
the "comprehensive scheme" principle, severely limits the available
challenges to commerce legislation.299 And the Court's willingness to
uphold the regulation of local activities without any real showing of
necessity enables Congress to justify its actions with ease. Most im-
portantly, however, the doctrinal developments in Raich allow Con-
297. State and local governments are probably able to take credit for the efforts of federal
agencies in drug enforcement because the lines of political accountability are skewed in this area.
See supra notes 271-278 and accompanying text.
298. See supra notes 279-284 and accompanying text.
299. See infra notes 301-319 and accompanying text.
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gress to reach into the states to an extent that threatens to obliterate
the very benefits to individuals that federalism is intended to create. 3°
A. Raich Leaves Almost No Limits on the Reach of the
Commerce Power
Justice O'Connor, in dissent, noted that the Court's decision in
Raich essentially turned Lopez into a "drafting guide. '301 It is hard to
argue otherwise. The considerations that guided the Court's decisions
in Lopez and Morrison-the economic nature of the activity, the exis-
tence of findings, the jurisdictional element, and the presence of a
comprehensive scheme 3 2-are still present in the substantial effects
analysis. But Raich seems to give Congress an example of how to
satisfy those considerations to reach nearly any activity it desires.
The jurisdictional element prong is easy to satisfy. 30 3 If Congress is
attempting to reach an activity that involves some object or instru-
ment, it need only draft the statute to apply to any such object that has
moved in interstate commerce. The clearest example of this is the
GFSZA at issue in Lopez. After the Court invalidated the GFSZA,
Congress amended the statute to apply only to guns that "[had]
moved in or that otherwise affect[ed]" interstate commerce. 30 4 Be-
cause the existence of a jurisdictional element spares the statute in
question from the more demanding substantial effects analysis,30 5 it
allows Congress to regulate conduct under the pretense of regulating
objects. 30 6 This is the most "glaring fault" with the jurisdictional ele-
ment: "[I]t [can] be exploited by Congress to uphold any Commerce
Clause statute. '307
Raich indicates that the only thing easier to provide than a jurisdic-
tional element is a set of "findings." As long as Congress puts forth a
list of assertions that if true would support the claimed connection to
commerce, the Court will be satisfied. 30 8 In Raich, the Court did not
300. See infra notes 320-333 and accompanying text.
301. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 46 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
302. See supra notes 107-110 and accompanying text.
303. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
304. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (2000). This version of the statute has already been upheld by
the Eighth Circuit against a Commerce Clause challenge. See United States v. Danks, 221 F.3d
1037 (8th Cir. 1999).
305. See McGimsey, supra note 95, at 1679-81.
306. The Court will no longer question this pretense. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S.
100, 113 (1941). Thus, if Congress wanted to regulate the sugar intake of American citizens, it
could constitutionally prohibit the possession of chocolate bars that had moved in interstate
commerce under the guise that it was regulating the chocolate, not individuals' diets.
307. Dral & Phillips, supra note 119, at 627-28.
308. See supra notes 221-252 and accompanying text.
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question the methods or data used to generate those findings, or even
whether such data exist. The Court seems to be saying, "give us a
story-as long as it's not too farfetched (i.e., Lopez), we'll accept it."
This blind acceptance of "bare declarations" 30 9 is not particularly
significant with respect to findings about Congress's reasons for legis-
lating or the wisdom thereof.310 There may even be reasons for judi-
cial deference to such findings; the role of courts in Commerce Clause
review is to determine whether Congress can legislate in a certain
area, not whether Congress should. But Raich seems to sanction judi-
cial deference not only to these findings of policy, but also to what
could be called "jurisdictional" findings-those findings that provide
support for Congress's exercise of authority.
The effects of this deference are best illustrated by the final two
factors-the economic nature of the activity and the existence of a
comprehensive scheme-considered by the Court in Lopez, Morrison,
and Raich. Lopez and Morrison suggest that Congress may not aggre-
gate the effects of noneconomic activity in order to show a substantial
effect on commerce. 31' Under this principle, presumably, if Raich and
Monson's activities had been termed noneconomic, 31 2 the effect of
their conduct could not be considered in the aggregate, and it would
be difficult to see how their medicinal marijuana use substantially af-
fected interstate commerce. But Lopez and Raich recognize an ex-
ception to this nonaggregation principle where the activity being
regulated is part of a larger regulatory scheme that would be undercut
unless the noneconomic activity were included. 313 So how does the
Court determine whether the regulated activity in a given case is an
"essential part of a larger regulation"? 31 4 Raich suggests that it should
simply ask Congress-or more accurately, examine Congress's "find-
ings." Specifically, the Court looked at findings asserting that the reg-
ulation of intrastate marijuana possession was essential to regulating
interstate marijuana possession. 31 5 In short, the Court took Con-
gress's word for it.
309. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 54 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
310. For instance, consider Congress's determination that illegal possession or use of con-
trolled substances has "a substantial and detrimental effect on the health ... of the American
people." 21 U.S.C. § 801(2) (2000).
311. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
312. This is assuming, of course, that the Court would undertake an analysis of the CSA as
applied to their specific activities-a dubious assumption after Raich itself. See supra notes
211-220 and accompanying text.
313. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 22-25; United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995).
314. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
315. These are the type of jurisdictional findings referred to above. Raich, 545 U.S. at 12-13.
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What this means is that the doctrinal limitations on the scope of the
commerce power have been eliminated. When the Court reviews
commerce legislation under the "instrumentalities" or "channels"
prongs, the analysis is typically very deferential, and generally results
in the validation of the act in question. 31 6 Lopez and Morrison
seemed to indicate that, at least in the substantial effects prong, the
Court may still have been willing to impose some limitations on Con-
gress's authority over intrastate affairs. But after Raich, those limita-
tions may have eroded. If Congress wishes to regulate purely
intrastate, noneconomic activity of virtually any type it chooses, it has
a host of options to insulate itself from constitutional challenge. Con-
gress can attach a jurisdictional element, pulling the legislation into
the instrumentalities prong, and thereby receiving more lenient re-
view.317 Congress can also include the activity within a larger scheme,
thus shielding it from the economic/noneconomic analysis. 318 All
Congress needs to do to convince the Court that the activity is an
"essential" part of that larger scheme is include a "finding" to that
effect, which the Court seems to accept unquestioningly. And should
Congress fail to utilize one of these options, it still need not fear that
the Court will find the subject of legislation to be noneconomic-the
Court's "exceedingly broad" definition of economic 319 puts that threat
to rest. Raich gave Congress all the necessary tools to get around the
Court's doctrinal limits on regulation of intrastate activities, rendering
those limits nugatory.
B. The Limitless Reach of the Commerce Power Prevents
Individuals from Realizing Federalism's Benefits
So what? There are many who reject the notion of "states' rights"
insofar as it suggests that states should have a judicial remedy for any
federal intrusion.320 And if, as Wechsler proposed, courts are on their
316. See McGimsey, supra note 95, at 1680.
317. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
318. Justice O'Connor argued that under the majority's reasoning, if Congress included the
GFSZA within a statute prohibiting the "transfer or possession of a firearm anywhere in the
nation," it would have been upheld in Lopez. Raich, 545 U.S. at 46 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
319. Randy E. Barnett, Foreword: Limiting Raich, 9 LEwis & CLARK L. REV. 743, 749 (2005);
accord supra note 180 and accompanying text.
320. See generally Timothy Zick, Statehood as the New Personhood: The Discovery of Funda-
mental "States' Rights," 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 213, 282 (2004) (arguing that "[sitates' rights
are not merely the flip side of the powers coin" that would entitle states to judicial enforcement
of limitations on federal power (internal quotation marks omitted)). But cf. Baker & Young,
supra note 11, at 135-39 (refuting the justifications for judicial nonenforcement of federalism
limitations on national power).
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"weakest ground" when invalidating federal legislation on federalism
grounds,321 that would seem especially true where, as with the CSA,
invalidation on federalism grounds may contradict the will of not only
the federal and state governments, but the citizens themselves.322 But
for those who would reserve judicial resources for the protection of
individual rights,323 it is important to realize that our federalist system
is in many respects a guardian of individual values rather than states'
rights.324 Angel Raich and Diane Monson are unique examples of
how federalism serves individuals, and how the expansion of federal
power can harm individual interests.
First, federalism serves individuals by providing a diverse array of
"legal regimes" from which citizens can choose.325 This not only al-
lows individuals to "vote with their feet" 326 by moving to states that
reflect their legal positions. It also allows citizens to have a stronger
voice in local legislation by means of ballot initiatives and other direct
voting mechanisms, which are not available on the federal level.327
The citizens of California chose to create a legal exemption for medic-
inal marijuana use, apparently finding it to be of a different moral
character than recreational marijuana use. Federalism allows citizens
of a particular state to draw such distinctions, and enact or support
state legislation accordingly. And it allows individuals such as Angel
Raich and Diane Monson to reap the benefits of that legislation by
living in (or moving to) a state that allows them legal access to what
they feel is the most effective remedy for their multitude of maladies.
Intrusive federal legislation such as the CSA allows none of these
things.
Second, federalism allows the states to act as "critical staging
grounds" for changing national policy. 328 By allowing states to act as
laboratories for democracy, 329 other states may see the results of ex-
321. See Wechsler, supra note 8, at 559.
322. See supra notes 267-298 and accompanying text.
323. See Choper, supra note 8.
324. Even opponents of the "political safeguards" judicial philosophy "concede that states'
rights have no independent value; their worth derives entirely from their utility in enhancing the
freedom and welfare of individuals." Baker & Young, supra note 11, at 135.
325. See id. at 139.
326. Young, supra note 212, at 54 (quoting Richard A. Epstein, Exit Rights Under Federalism,
55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1992, at 147, 150).
327. See DuVivier, supra note 277, at 222.
328. Cf. Baker & Young, supra note 11, at 137-38.
329. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without
risk to the rest of the country.").
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perimental legislation and adopt it themselves. Thus, changes in pol-
icy can gain support on a state-by-state level until that support is
sufficient to influence federal policy.330 Medicinal marijuana again
provides a useful illustration. Since California enacted the CUA in
1996, eight more states have adopted similar medicinal marijuana
laws. 33' Given the recent number of attempts at reforming the CSA's
classification of marijuana, 332 it may be that medicinal marijuana will
eventually gain enough support to make those attempts successful.
But by allowing the CSA to reach purely intrastate activity, the Court
publicly validated the exercise of federal power and may have discour-
aged states from further experimentation in that area.
333
All this is not meant to imply that the CSA is unconstitutional or
that the federal government lacks authority to reach any "purely in-
trastate" activity. The point is that questions of states' rights do have
profound impacts on individual values. As such, constitutional chal-
lenges based on questions of federalism deserve no less scrutiny, and
no more deference to Congress, than questions of individual rights.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Raich decision has removed most-if not all-of the doctrinal
limitations on the reach of the commerce power. It has done so at the
expense of the individual values that federalism is designed to protect.
But it may yet be possible for the Court to limit the effects of this
decision if it chooses. One avenue is to recognize the as-applied chal-
lenge in the commerce context. Although it seems like the Court re-
jected this option in Raich, there is language in the opinion that could
support another reading.334 Analysis of a given regulation by refer-
ence to the specific activity at issue in a particular case would, at a
minimum, limit Congress's reach to those activities that actually affect
interstate commerce in some way. Another option would be to simply
demand a stronger showing on the record of the claimed connection
330. Cf Baker & Young, supra note 11, at 137-38.
331. See DuVivier, supra note 277, at 283-86. Specifically, the states are Alaska, Arizona,
Colorado, Maine, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington. Id.
332. See supra note 284 and accompanying text.
333. In fact, the Raich ruling prompted California to suspend its identification card program
for medicinal marijuana users. It also prompted the governor of Rhode Island to veto a similar
law enacted just one day after the ruling. Health Highlights: California Suspends Medical Mari-
juana I.D. Card Program, HEALTH DAY, July 9, 2005, 2005 WLNR 10775585.
334. At some points, the Court analyzed the CSA in terms of all "intrastate manufacture and
possession of marijuana"; at others, in terms of "respondents' activities." Gonzales v. Raich, 545
U.S. 1, 22 (2005). While the former suggests a facial analysis of the statute, the latter may sug-
gest an as-applied analysis-since it arguably refers to "the intrastate manufacture and posses-
sion of marijuana for medical purposes pursuant to California law." Id. at 15.
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to commerce, at least in terms of the jurisdictional findings.335 Al-
though Raich's treatment of congressional findings is very deferential,
the ongoing shift in the Court's personnel may be accompanied by a
shift in attitude. 336
As it stands, there are few areas that remain off limits to federal
regulation. Time will tell if the Court will reestablish some limitations
and retreat from its deference to Congress, or whether the federal
government will forevermore be able to regulate "quilting bees,
clothes drives, and potluck suppers throughout the 50 States. ' 337
Louis C. Shansky*
335. See supra note 315 and accompanying text.
336. There has been some speculation that new Chief Justice John Roberts Jr. is "willing[ ] to
closely scrutinize acts of Congress to ensure they are a proper exercise of the Commerce power."
Jeff Bleich et al., The New Chief, 66 OR. ST. B. BULL., Nov. 2005, at 18, 23. And the newly
confirmed Justice Samuel Alito may share a similar willingness, if anything is to be gleaned from
his dissent in United States v. Rybar. 103 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 1996) (upholding the regulation of
intrastate machine gun possession on the grounds that such possession could facilitate violent
crime which could affect interstate commerce). Then-Judge Alito noted that his "problem with
[the Government's theory] is that it rests on an empirical proposition for which neither Con-
gress, the Executive (in the form of the government lawyers who briefed and argued this case),
nor the majority has adduced any appreciable empirical proof." Id. at 292 (Alito, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added).
337. Raich, 545 U.S. at 69 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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